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BETWEEN A ROCK AND AN ETHICAL DUTY:
ATTORNEY OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE
REPORTING REQUIREMENT OF NEW MEXICO’S
ABUSE AND NEGLECT ACT
Kirsten Dick*

Every person in New Mexico has a statutory duty to report known
or suspected child abuse or neglect to the proper authorities. Does
this duty extend to attorneys who have their own set of ethical rules
prohibiting disclosure of confidential client information? In State
v. Strauch, the New Mexico Supreme Court held that the “every
person” language of the Abuse and Neglect Act extends the
mandatory duty to report to all persons, not just those
professionals who work most frequently with children and are
enumerated in the statute. This interpretation spurs an analysis of
the interplay among the attorney-client privilege, the rules of
professional conduct for attorneys, and the legislative authority to
affect these rules of the court. Likely, the court rules governing
ethical attorney conduct and the attorney-client privilege
supersede the legislature’s attempt to require attorneys to report
child abuse or neglect when doing so would violate attorney-client
confidentiality.
INTRODUCTION
“Thanks for coming in today. Before we get started, I want to make sure we
are on the same page about a couple of things. First, I have agreed to represent you,
so going forward, I will offer my advice and expertise pertaining to your legal issues,
but you have the final say-so about what steps we take. Next, I want you to know
that most everything we discuss together will be kept in the strictest confidence. I
cannot share anything you tell me without your permission – unless you’re asking
me to help you commit a crime, but of course, that’s not what we’re here to do. Oh,
and I should mention that if you tell me anything that relates to the abuse or neglect
of a child, I may be required to make a report to the police or social services. Alright,
let’s get started. Tell me what’s going on in your case.”

* University of New Mexico School of Law, Class of 2018. I would like to thank Professor David
Stout for his guidance and assistance in unpacking this tricky ethical question. I would also like to thank
Matthew Bernstein for allowing me the opportunity to witness his untiring devotion to his young clients.
Professor Walker Boyd, Javier Garcia, Ricardo Roybal, Jesse Montoya, John Pierce, and the students of
the law review seminar, thank you for your precise edits and sound advice through this process. Finally,
I wish to thank my friends and family, particularly my husband Jamie and my parents Lou and Darcy.
You inspire me to learn more and work harder.
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This would not be an unusual way for an attorney in New Mexico to begin
a relationship with a new client. The language of the reporting statute of the Abuse
and Neglect Act (“the Act”) seems to create a universal reporting requirement
wherein all persons in the state must report when they know or suspect that a child
might be abused or neglected.1 The legislature did not specify whether an attorney is
subject to the reporting requirement,2 and the courts have not been presented with
such a clear question for review.3 Accordingly, New Mexico attorneys find
themselves in an uncertain environment where the rules of professional conduct and
the attorney-client privilege seem to instruct against a mandatory reporting duty for
attorneys, but state law suggests otherwise.4
Attorneys as mandatory reporters cuts both ways in terms of benefitting
child welfare in the state. On the one hand, informing clients of a potential duty to
report child abuse or neglect at the outset of an attorney-client relationship could lead
to chilled communications between the client and his attorney.5 This is especially
true in family and children’s law cases where abuse and neglect may be an important
part of the client’s story, but the client is reluctant to share that information for fear
of retribution or collapse of the family unit.6 For example, a teenager with an abusive
home life might seek out an attorney in his pursuit of emancipation or kinshipguardianship. When the attorney mentions that he must report child abuse or neglect
to the authorities, the young client might be hesitant to share that he has been abused.
If the client does tell his attorney and the attorney makes a report, the client will have
indirectly implicated his parents and will likely become involved with social
services. The solution he sought (living on his own or with family members) may
become more difficult to achieve. If the client does not tell his attorney, the attorney
does not have the complete story and may suggest a legal path that could be
ultimately detrimental to the client’s interests.
On the other hand, attorneys may be in an ideal position to report child
abuse and neglect. Family and children’s law attorneys come in more frequent
contact with families who are seeking legal solutions to bad situations. Because
children are more susceptible to abuse, an attorney rightly may be more concerned
with protecting a young client than she is with protecting their confidential
communications.7 Returning to the example of the teenaged client seeking
1. See N.M. STAT. ANN. 1978, § 32A-4-3(A) (2005).
2. See id.
3. See State v. Strauch, 2015-NMSC-009, ¶ 41, 345 P.3d 317 (explaining that the court would
consider the rules of professional conduct in reviewing a case where an attorney seeks to protect
confidential communications relating to abuse or neglect, though that situation was not before the court
in the instant case).
4. See Ellen Marrus, Please Keep My Secret: Child Abuse Reporting Statutes, Confidentiality, and
Juvenile Delinquency, 11 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 509, 520 (1997-1998) (pointing to New Mexico as a
state with a universal mandatory statute that does not mention the attorney-client privilege, causing an
attorney to be “legitimately confused over her responsibility.”).
5. See Adrienne Jennings Lockie, Salt in the Wounds: Why Attorneys Should not be Mandated
Reporters of Child Abuse, 36 N.M. L. REV. 125, 140 (2006) (“Merely explaining the mandatory child
abuse reporting obligations to clients affects the development of a meaningful attorney-client
relationship.”).
6. See id. at 125.
7. See Marrus, supra note 4, at 526.
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emancipation or kinship guardianship, the client may be afforded more advantageous
options for his future if his attorney reports the abuse. His needs may be better served
if he lives with a foster family where he could benefit from the state’s social
programs for abused youth.8 Furthermore, if the attorney reports the abuse, the state
would be in a better position to protect the client (and possibly other children) from
continued cruelty at the hands of his parents.
The question of whether an attorney in New Mexico must report child abuse
or neglect turns on an analysis of judicial authority to shield court rules from
legislative action. After a background section describing the rules governing
attorney-client confidentiality and the evolution of New Mexico’s reporting statute,
Part I of this comment will focus on the separate powers of the judiciary and the
legislature to regulate attorney conduct and court procedure. Part II will explore
various scenarios wherein the reporting statute is consistent with the court rules
regarding attorney-client confidentiality, and scenarios where the reporting statute
conflicts with the court rules. In instances where the latter is true, the reporting statute
likely would not be given effect and the court rules would take precedence. Finally,
this comment will suggest in Part III that the Act’s reporting statute is a barrier to
open and honest attorney-client communications. For this reason, attorneys should
not be required to report child abuse or neglect when they learn of its occurrence in
the context of a client relationship.
BACKGROUND
Ethical Duties and the Attorney-Client Privilege
Attorneys are bound by two rules governing disclosure of confidential client
information. The first is the attorney-client privilege, a common law privilege
codified in the New Mexico Rules of Evidence.9 The common law attorney-client
privilege typically protects communications made in confidence between a lawyer
and a client for the provision of legal services.10 New Mexico Rule 11-503(B) reflects
the common law understanding of the privilege, “A client has a privilege to refuse to
disclose, and to prevent any other person from disclosing, a confidential
communication made for the purpose of facilitating or providing professional legal
services to that client.”11 The purpose of the attorney-client privilege is to foster
honest communications between the attorney and client and is “rooted in the
imperative need for confidence and trust.”12
The second rule protecting client confidences is Rule 16-106 of the New
Mexico Rules of Professional Conduct.13 Under this rule, attorneys “shall not reveal
8. See e.g. Laura Thoren, College Tuition Waived for Teens in Foster Care, KOAT.COM (Mar. 12,
2014, 8:04 AM), http://www.koat.com/article/college-tuition-waived-for-teens-in-foster-care/5055023.
9. Rule 11-503 NMRA.
10. See DAVID A. SKLANSKY, EVIDENCE: CASES, COMMENTARY, AND PROBLEMS 632–33 (4th ed.
2016).
11. Rule 11-503(B) NMRA.
12. See Albuquerque Rape Crisis Ctr. v. Blackmer, 2005-NMSC-032, ¶ 15, 120 P.3d 820 (explaining
that the purpose of the psychotherapist-patient privilege is like the attorney-client privilege in promoting
“confidence and trust.”) (quoting Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 51 (1980)).
13. Rule 16-106 NMRA.
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information relating to the representation of a client” unless the client gives informed
consent, the attorney is impliedly authorized to disclose the information in the course
of representation, or the disclosure fits into a number of exceptions to the rule.14 This
rule is mandatory. An attorney who reveals confidential client information outside
of the allowable exceptions may face disciplinary action.15
The exceptions to the prohibition on disclosure allow attorneys to reveal
confidential client information in order to prevent grave physical harm or comply
with other laws.16 Disclosure under these circumstances is permissive; an attorney is
not required to reveal confidential information even when the exceptions to the
general prohibition apply. Under Rule 16-106(B)(1), an attorney is allowed to reveal
confidential information “to prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily
harm.”17 According to the rule’s commentary, “reasonably certain death or
substantial bodily harm . . . is reasonably certain to occur if it will be suffered
imminently or if there is a present and substantial threat that a person will suffer such
harm at a later date if the lawyer fails to take action necessary to eliminate the
threat.”18 Under Rule 16-106(B)(6), an attorney may disclose confidential
information “to comply with other law or a court order.”19 The commentary to the
rule notes that “[w]hether such a law supersedes Rule 16-106 . . . is a question of law
beyond the scope of these rules.”20 This paper will analyze this question as it pertains
to the mandatory reporting statute in Part I.
Reporting Child Abuse and Neglect in New Mexico
The reporting requirement of the Abuse and Neglect Act, part of the New
Mexico Children’s Code, provides an opportunity to apply the aforementioned
confidentiality rules and exceptions for attorneys in the context of child abuse and
neglect. The primary purposes of the Children’s Code are to protect children from
harm and provide them the opportunity to develop in a wholesome and safe
environment.21 To those ends, the Act facially requires that everyone report child
abuse and neglect. The reporting statute states, “Every person, including [certain
professionals], who knows or has a reasonable suspicion that a child is an abused22

14. Rule 16-106(A) NMRA.
15. See Rule 16-804(A) NMRA; Rule 16-805 NMRA.
16. See Rule 16-106(B)(1), (6) NMRA.
17. Rule 16-106(B)(1) NMRA.
18. Comment 8 to Rule 16-106 NMRA.
19. Rule 16-106(B)(6) NMRA.
20. Comment 14 to Rule 16-106 NMRA.
21. See N.M. STAT. ANN. 1978, § 32A-1-3 (2009).
22. N.M. STAT. ANN. 1978, § 32A-4-2(B) (2016) (defining an “abused child” as a child who has
suffered or who is at risk of suffering serious harm, such as physical, emotional, psychological, or sexual
abuse, sexual exploitation, life endangerment, torture, cruel confinement, or cruel punishment, because of
the action or inaction of the child’s parent, guardian or custodian).
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or a neglected23 child shall report the matter immediately to [local authorities].”24
Failure to report known or suspected child abuse or neglect is punishable as a
misdemeanor.25
The list of professionals in the reporting statute includes licensed
physicians, nurses, and teachers, among others who are typically regarded as
“mandatory reporters” of child abuse and neglect because of their frequent work with
children.26 The list also includes members of the clergy, but requires them to report
only if they have information that is “not privileged as a matter of law.”27 Attorneys
are not specifically mentioned in the reporting statute.28
To report child abuse or neglect, an individual may contact local law
enforcement, the Children, Youth, and Families Department (CYFD), or tribal law
enforcement or social services for Indian children living in Indian country.29 Those
agencies must make a written report that includes the child’s name, age, address, “the
nature and extent of the child’s injuries, including any evidence of previous injuries,”
and any other information the reporter thinks might be helpful in the investigation.30
The report must also include the names and addresses of the child’s parents,
guardian, or custodian.31 All reports are then referred to CYFD which conducts an
investigation and makes an action determination based on the best interests of the
child.32
Child abuse and neglect as a social, legislative issue took hold of public
interest in the 1960’s.33 Medical professionals had compiled the first medical profile
of an abused child and communities increasingly became aware of the problem.34
Those working on the issue sought new laws to help identify incidents of child abuse
so it could be treated and prevented.35 The first child abuse reporting statutes were
enacted by twenty states in 1964.36 The following year, New Mexico passed its first
child abuse reporting statute.37 The state’s original reporting statute was permissive,
not mandatory. It allowed any physician, nurse, teacher, social worker acting in an

23. N.M. STAT. ANN. 1978, § 32A-4-2(F) (defining a “neglected child” as a child “who has been
abandoned by the child’s parent, guardian or custodian” or whose parent, guardian, or custodian has failed
to care and provide for the child’s “subsistence, education, medical or other care or control necessary for
the child’s well-being” because of their own “faults or habits.”).
24. N.M. STAT. ANN. 1978, § 32A-4-3(A) (2005).
25. See N.M. STAT. ANN. 1978, § 32A-4-3(F) (2005).
26. See CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, CHILDREN’S BUREAU, MANDATORY REPORTERS OF
CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT 2 (2015) [hereinafter MANDATORY REPORTERS OF CHILD ABUSE AND
NEGLECT].
27. N.M. STAT. ANN. 1978, § 32A-4-3(A).
28. See id.
29. See id.
30. See N.M. STAT. ANN. 1978, § 32A-4-3(B).
31. See id.
32. See N.M. STAT. ANN. 1978, § 32A-4-4(A) (2005).
33. See NATIONAL CENTER ON CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT, CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT: STATE
REPORTING LAWS 2 (1979) [hereinafter STATE REPORTING LAWS].
34. See id.
35. See id.
36. Id.
37. Act of Mar. 25, 1965, ch. 157, § 2, 1965 N.M. Laws 409, 409-410.
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official capacity, or ordained minister to report suspected child abuse without
opening himself or herself up to civil liability.38
Reporting child abuse was not a nationwide obligation until Congress
passed the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment and Adoption Reform Act, which
required all states to pass mandatory reporting laws.39 The majority of states chose
to limit the duty to report to specified professionals who frequently worked with
children – the aforementioned mandatory reporters.40 In 1973, New Mexico amended
its statute to require the same set of professionals and “any other person having
reason to believe” a child had been abused or neglected to immediately report.41
Twenty years later, New Mexico amended the reporting statute again to read that
“every person” had a duty to report child abuse and neglect.42
New Mexico’s current reporting requirement follows a general-specific
construction.43 Its combination of “every person” language with a specified list of
professionals created confusion about who was actually required to report. The case
of State v. Strauch illuminates this confusion, even among the state’s appellate
courts.44
In State v. Strauch, the court was asked to determine whether a private
social worker45 was a mandatory reporter under the Act who must testify in court to
his knowledge of child abuse. In this case, the defendant was accused of sexually
abusing his daughter.46 The prosecution sought the testimony of the defendant’s
social worker.47 In response, the defendant filed a protective order claiming the
conversations with the social worker were confidential communications made for the
purpose of diagnosis and treatment, which are privileged under the New Mexico
Rules of Evidence.48 The prosecution argued that the social worker must reveal any
knowledge of abuse or neglect based on the Act’s requirement that “every person”
report known or suspected child abuse or neglect.49
38. Id.; see also State v. Strauch, 2015-NMSC-009, ¶ 22, 345 P.3d 317.
39. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 5101-5107 (2012).
40. See MANDATORY REPORTERS OF CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT, supra note 26, at 2.
41. Act of Apr. 3, 1973, ch. 360, § 2(a), 1973 N.M. Laws 1653, 1657-58; see also Strauch, 2015NMSC-009, ¶ 31, 345 P.3d at 325.
42. Act of Mar. 19, 1993, ch. 77, § 97(a), 1993 N.M. Laws 653, 793-794; see also Strauch, 2015NMSC-009, ¶ 31, 345 P.3d at 325.
43. See N.M. STAT. ANN. 1978, § 32A-4-3(A) (2016); see also Strauch, ¶ 35, 345 P.3d at 327.
44. See generally State v. Strauch, 2014-NMCA-020, 317 P.3d 878; State v. Strauch, 2015-NMSC009, 345 P.3d 317.
45. The statute names social workers “acting in an official capacity” as one of the groups of
professionals specifically included in the reporting requirement (emphasis added). The district court
determined that a private social worker does not act in an official capacity. Strauch, 2015-NMSC-009, ¶
6, 345 P.3d at 320. The New Mexico Supreme Court considered the private social worker to be covered
by the statute’s universal language and did not reach the issue of private versus official capacity. See
Strauch, 2015-NMSC-009, ¶ 35, 345 P.3d at 327.
46. Strauch, 2015-NMSC-009, ¶ 4.
47. Strauch, 2015-NMSC-009, ¶¶ 3–4.
48. See Strauch, 2015-NMSC-009, ¶ 4; see also Rule 11-504 NMRA.
49. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 7, State v. Strauch, 2014-NMCA-020 (Ct. App. No. 34,435);
see also Strauch, 2015-NMSC-009, ¶ 5 (explaining that the prosecution also argued that the social worker
was bound by the Social Work Practice Act confidentiality exception that required disclosure of child
abuse or neglect in court hearings).
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On interlocutory appeal of the district court’s finding that the social worker
was not a mandatory reporter under the Act, the New Mexico Court of Appeals held
that the reporting requirement did not apply to every person.50 The Court of Appeals
reasoned that despite the “every person” language, the legislature only intended to
extend a mandatory reporting requirement to the statutory list of professionals and
“others like them.”51 According to the Court of Appeals, “To do otherwise would
render the inclusion of these specific categories of professionals essentially
meaningless.”52
The New Mexico Supreme Court found otherwise and reversed the Court
of Appeals. It interpreted the statute to impose universal reporting requirements on
all individuals in New Mexico, not just those professionals enumerated in the statute.
53
It held that the social worker was a mandatory reporter under the Act,54 and must
be compelled to testify to his knowledge of child abuse in the case against the alleged
abuser.55 The court explained that the legislature meant to include everyone when it
added the words “or any other person” to the 1973 reporting statute.56 Echoing the
Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court inversely reasoned that “[i]nterpreted
otherwise, the [“any other person”] amendment would have been meaningless.”57
Though the Strauch court held that the reporting statute created a universal
requirement for all individuals, it hinted at an exception for attorneys subject to the
court rules of professional conduct.58 This nod to conflicting statutory and regulatory
requirements for attorneys highlights the crucial interplay between state law and
court rules.
ANALYSIS
I.

SEPARATION OF POWERS: RULES OF THE NEW MEXICO
SUPREME COURT AND STATE LAW

The New Mexico Constitution vests the state courts with the power to
enforce rules of procedure and practice,59 including the rules of evidence,60 common

50. See Strauch, 2014-NMCA-020, ¶ 10.
51. See id. ¶ 12.
52. Id.
53. See Strauch, 2015-NMSC-009, ¶ 33.
54. Id. ¶ 38.
55. See id. ¶ 47.
56. See id. ¶ 35.
57. Id.
58. See id. ¶ 41.
59. See N.M. CONST. art. VI, § 3; Hudson v. State, 1976-NMSC-084, ¶ 4, 557 P.2d 1108 (“Pursuant
to N.M.Const. art. 6, s 3 this court has superintending control over all inferior courts, and thus the power
to regulate and to promulgate rules regarding the pleadings, practice, and procedure affecting the judicial
branch of government.”); see also State v. Roy, 1936-NMSC-048, ¶ 90, 60 P.2d 646 (“The powers
essential to the functioning of courts, in the absence of the clearest language to the contrary in the
constitution, are to be taken as committed solely to [the judiciary] to avoid a confusion in the methods of
procedure and to provide uniform rules of pleading and practice.”).
60. See Ammerman v. Hubbard Broad., Inc., 1976-NMSC-031, ¶ 8, 551 P.2d 1354 (“It is equally
true that rules of evidence are procedural, in that they are a part of the judicial machinery administered by
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law privileges,61 and rules of professional conduct for attorneys.62 The New Mexico
Supreme Court has the power to regulate the attorney-client privilege as both a court
rule and a common law privilege.63
Rules of privilege are rules of evidence under the purview of the judicial
branch by virtue of the New Mexico Constitution.64 The court addressed this
assertion in Ammerman v. Hubbard Broadcasting, Inc., where the plaintiffs sought
a court order forcing the defendant journalists to name their confidential informants
and produce all information received by said informants.65 The defendants refused,
asserting a journalist privilege, which the legislature had enacted to state law.66 The
law carved out a privilege in journalists not to disclose sources or unpublished
information unless disclosure would be “essential to prevent injustice.”67 The
Ammerman court held that the defendants could not assert the journalist privilege in
judicial proceedings.68 The court explained that the legislative branch lacked the
constitutional power to enact statutory rules of procedure, including rules of
evidence.69 It declared that “statutes purporting to regulate practice and procedure in
the courts cannot be binding.”70
The Ammerman court relied heavily on State v. Roy, in which the court
established the constitutional basis for its control of the rules of pleading, practice,
and procedure.71 In Roy, the court declined to hold that the legislature had no control
over the same rules, but mentioned that should a conflict arise between a statute and
a court rule,72 the judiciary would have to determine which branch was “paramount
in the rule-making field, the court or the Legislature.”73

the courts for determining the facts upon which the substantive rights of the litigant rest and are
resolved.”).
61. See id. ¶ 7 (“‘[N]o officers of any department of government, other than the judiciary, have the
constant opportunity to observe [common law privileges] in operation and the skill to determine how far
and in what respects they interfere with the orderly and effective administration of justice.’”) (quoting
Edmund M. Morgan, Rules of Evidence – Substantive or Procedural?, 10 VAND. L. REV. 467, 484 (1957)).
62. See Strauch, 2015-NMSC-009, ¶ 41 (suggesting that Rule 16-106 of the New Mexico Rules of
Professional Conduct for attorneys fall under the regulatory authority of the New Mexico Supreme Court).
63. See Ammerman, 1976-NMSC-031, ¶¶ 7-9.
64. See id. ¶ 6, 551 P.2d at 1356 (“There can be no real question about rules of privilege being rules
of evidence, when considered in the context of being exceptions to the general requirement and liability
of everyone to give testimony or furnish evidence upon all facts inquired of in a court of justice.”).
65. See id. ¶ 1.
66. See id. ¶ 2.
67. See id.
68. See id. ¶ 4.
69. See id. ¶ 17.
70. Id.
71. See id. ¶ 10; State v. Roy, 1936-NMSC-048, ¶¶ 89-90, 60 P.2d 646.
72. When such a conflict between the legislature and judicial branches arose over procedural
requirements for the appointment of a district judge in State ex rel. Anaya v. McBride, the New Mexico
Supreme Court found that the court was paramount. 1975-NMSC-032, ¶ 11, 539 P.2d 1006. Though the
legislature had attempted to regulate rules of practice and procedure in the past, it lacked the constitutional
authority to do so. Id. Setting up the holding in Ammerman, the McBride court stated that the constitutional
power to regulate judicial practice and procedure is “vested exclusively in this court.” Id.
73. Roy, 1936-NMSC-048, ¶ 83; see Ammerman, 1976-NMSC-031, ¶ 12 (discussing the holding of
State v. Roy).
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In the event that a statutory privilege conforms with the purpose of a courtgoverned evidentiary privilege, the court will likely give effect to the statutory
privilege.74 In Albuquerque Rape Crisis Center v. Blackmer, the defendant, charged
with rape, sought to compel testimony from counselors at the Albuquerque Rape
Crisis Center, with whom the alleged victim had conferred.75 The counselors asserted
that communications with the alleged victim were protected by the Confidentiality
Act, a law protecting communications made during the course of treatment for an
emotional or psychological condition.76 The district court granted the defendant’s
order to compel, but the New Mexico Supreme Court stayed the order and ultimately
reversed the district court with instructions to give merit to the Confidentiality Act.77
The Blackmer court held that the Confidentiality Act’s non-disclosure
provisions were to be given effect because their purpose aligned with the purpose of
the psychiatrist-patient privilege promulgated in evidentiary Rule 11-504.78 The
court relied on Professors Browde and Occhialino’s analysis that “‘the supreme court
intended not to exclude the legislature from the rule-making process but only
intended to assure judicial supremacy in any clash between legislative and judicial
rules of procedure.’”79
Though the Confidentiality Act and Rule 11-504 did not clash in Blackmer,
that court nonetheless considered the result of such a legislative-judicial conflict. It
explained that if the legislature enacted a privilege affecting the same subject matter
as a judicial or constitutional privilege, then the court would “analyze the statutory
privilege to determine whether it is consistent with the purpose of the constitutional
or court rule privilege.” 80 If the legislative privilege is consistent with the court rule,
then both privileges would be given effect.81 If, however, “the statutory privilege is
not consistent, the statutory privilege is not given effect and the constitutional or
court rule privilege prevails.”82
Ten years after Blackmer, the New Mexico Supreme Court met again at the
intersection of legislative and judicial law regarding privilege in State v. Strauch.
The supreme court found that the court’s own evidentiary rule governing a privilege
for physical and mental health professionals83 “den[ied] protection from in-court
disclosure of matters that are required by law to be reported out of court.”84 Thus,
the communications between the social worker (as a mental health professional) and
the defendant were “not shielded from compelled disclosure by evidentiary

74. See Albuquerque Rape Crisis Ctr. v. Blackmer, 2005-NMSC-032, ¶ 13, 120 P.3d 820.
75. See id. ¶ 2.
76. See id. ¶¶ 3, 13; see also N.M. STAT. ANN. 1978, § 31-25-1 to § 31-25-6 (1987).
77. Blackmer, 2005-NMSC-032, ¶¶ 4, 21.
78. See id. ¶ 21; see also Rule 11-504 NMRA.
79. Blackmer, 2005-NMSC-032, ¶ 5 (quoting Michael B. Browde & M.E. Occhialino, Separation of
Powers and the Judicial Rule-Making Power in New Mexico: The Need for Prudential Constraints, 15
N.M. L. REV. 407, 437 (1985)).
80. Blackmer, 2005-NMSC-032, ¶ 11 (emphasis added).
81. See id.
82. Id. (emphasis added).
83. Rule 11-504 NMRA.
84. State v. Strauch, 2015-NMSC-009, ¶ 47.
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privilege.”85 In Strauch, the two rules at issue were consistent with each other, so the
court gave effect to the legislative act.
The Strauch court’s comparison of social workers and officers of the court
(i.e. attorneys) is notable for the purposes of assessing attorney requirements under
the Act. The court mentioned, in dicta, that social workers are not governed by “any
nonevidentiary rule of this Court” that would guard against disclosure of the statesought evidence distinguishing social workers from “officers of the court subject to
the regulatory authority of the Supreme Court” (e.g. attorneys). 86 The court noted
that attorneys, as officers of the court, are subject to Rule 16-106, “providing that no
attorney may disclose protected information concerning a client, whether in or out
of court, except in accordance with the rule.”87 Here, the court indicated that
attorneys are subject to a rule of the court that may conflict with a legislative statute.
II.
DOES THE COURT OR THE LEGISLATURE CONTROL
ATTORNEY CONDUCT RELATED TO THE ACT’S REPORTING
REQUIREMENT?
The mandatory reporting requirement of the Act may effectively abrogate
the attorney-client privilege and force attorneys to disclose confidential client
information despite the ethical court rule prohibiting disclosure generally.88 The
attorney-client privilege is not mentioned within the Act,89 but the statute’s broad,
inclusive language may be read to encroach upon an abrogation of the attorney-client
privilege in the context of child abuse and neglect.90
Because of this potential conflict, the reporting statute should be subject to
the Blackmer court’s consistency analysis to determine whether the statute is given
effect in light of the court rules governing attorney-client confidentiality. 91 This
analysis consists of three steps. First, does the reporting statute affect the same
subject matter as a court rule?92 Next, is the reporting statute consistent with the court
rule?93 Finally, if the reporting statute is consistent, then both the court rule and state
statute are given effect.94 If the reporting statute is inconsistent, then the court rule
takes precedence and the legislative act cannot be binding.95 This analysis yields
three possible results for attorney obligations under the reporting statute depending
on the facts of the attorney-client relationship: (1) the attorney-client privilege and
its crime-fraud exception may be consistent with the reporting statute, (2) the
85. Id.
86. Id. ¶ 41.
87. Id.
88. See Rule 16-106 NMRA.
89. See N.M. STAT. ANN. 1978 § 32A-4-3 (2005).
90. See Robert P. Mosteller, Child Abuse Reporting Laws and Attorney-Client Confidences: The
Reality and the Specter of Lawyer as Informant, 42 DUKE L. J. 203, 223 (positing that the overbroad
language of New Mexico’s reporting statute apparently abrogates all privileges, but ultimately stating that
it should not be read to eliminate the attorney-client privilege).
91. See Albuquerque Rape Crisis Ctr. v. Blackmer, 2005-NMSC-032, ¶ 11, 120 P.3d 820.
92. See id.
93. See id.
94. See id.
95. See id.
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attorney-client privilege and the reporting statute may be in conflict, or (3) the
reporting statute may conflict with Rule 16-106 and its exceptions.
A.

The reporting statute may be consistent with the attorney-client privilege
and its crime-fraud exception if a client is seeking legal advice in order to
commit child abuse or neglect.

By virtue of its requirement that every person report knowledge or suspicion
that a child is an abused or neglected child,96 the reporting statute affects the same
subject matter as the attorney-client privilege. That is, the statute could pertain to
confidential communications between a lawyer and her client for the purpose of
obtaining legal services by mandating that the attorney share with authorities
information about child abuse or neglect she received from her client. 97 If the client
is sharing the confidential information with his attorney in an effort to obtain legal
advice in furtherance of committing a crime, then the crime-fraud exception to the
attorney-client privilege takes effect.98 In such a case, the privilege would not attach
to the communications, therefore, the attorney-client privilege would not prevent an
attorney from disclosing the information shared by the client.99
If a client was seeking legal advice in order to carry out child abuse or
neglect, the court rule governing the attorney-client privilege and its crime-fraud
exception is consistent with the reporting requirement of the Act. Both rules serve
the purpose of gathering truth and preventing crime.100 Since the reporting statute
and the crime-fraud exception are in harmony with one another, both would be given
effect by the court.101
B.

The reporting statute may not be consistent with the attorney-client
privilege if the client is not seeking legal advice in furtherance of the
crime of child abuse or neglect.

Again, the language of the reporting requirement could affect confidential
information that is protected by the attorney-client privilege,102 so the first step of
the analysis is satisfied as both rules affect the same subject matter. If the attorney
receives confidential client communications about abuse or neglect, but the client is
not seeking assistance in committing child abuse or neglect, the crime-fraud
exception does not apply.103 In this scenario, the attorney-client privilege likely
would take precedence over the reporting statute.104
Let us return to the example of the teenager seeking emancipation who
secures an attorney to assist in the proceedings. Assuming the client is over fourteen
96. See N.M. STAT. ANN. 1978, § 32A-4-3(A) (2005).
97. See Rule 11-503(B) NMRA.
98. See Rule 11-503(D)(1) NMRA.
99. See id. The attorney may still be subject to the requirements of Rule 16-106. See Rule 16-106
NMRA.
100. Cf. N.M. STAT. ANN. 1978 § 30-6-1 (2009).
101. See Albuquerque Rape Crisis Ctr. v. Blackmer, 2005-NMSC-032, ¶ 11, 120 P.3d 820.
102. See Rule 11-503(B) NMRA.
103. See Rule 11-503(D)(1) NMRA.
104. See Blackmer, 2005-NMSC-032, ¶ 11.
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years of age, the attorney is not a guardian ad litem who must act in the child’s best
interest.105 Instead, the attorney is bound by the rules of professional conduct to abide
by the client’s decisions, just as he would an adult client.106 In the course of
discussing the client’s home life and reason for the emancipation, the attorney learns
his client has been abused in the past. At this point, the client would likely be
considered an “abused child” for the purposes of the reporting statute.107 The attorney
likely would run afoul of the attorney-client privilege if he reported the abuse against
his client’s wishes.
In this case, the reporting requirement is inconsistent with the attorneyclient privilege. The reporting statute seeks information from everyone regarding
child abuse and neglect, but the attorney-client privilege requires that the attorney
keep confidential his client’s communications relating to legal services. When
attorneys are made mandatory reporters of child abuse or neglect, the validity and
certainty of the attorney-client privilege is thrown into question.108
According to the U.S. Supreme Court in Upjohn Co. v. United States, for
the attorney-client privilege to serve its proper purpose, “the attorney and client must
be able to predict with some degree of certainty whether particular discussions will
be protected.”109 If the attorney is required to report otherwise privileged client
information, the confidentiality required for the attorney to carry out the
representation is no longer a sure-thing.110 This “uncertain privilege . . . is little better
than no privilege at all,” according to the Court.111 Because the reporting statute
would implicitly abrogate the attorney-client privilege under these circumstances,
throwing both rules into conflict, the court privilege rule would likely supersede the
statute, and the attorney would not be bound by the reporting requirement of the
Act.112
C.

The reporting statute is facially inconsistent with Rule 16-106, but may be
given effect in certain circumstances.

The reporting statute of the Act purports to require attorneys to report child
abuse or neglect even if doing so would force the attorney to disclose confidential
client information. For this reason, the reporting requirement and Rule 16-106 – a
court rule – pertain to the same subject matter. The first prong of the Blackmer
analysis is fulfilled.
The next step is to assess whether the statute and the rule are consistent with
one another. Here, the universal reporting requirement is in direct conflict with Rule
105. See N.M. STAT. ANN. 1978 § 32A-1-7.1(A) (2005) (“The [child’s] attorney shall provide the
same manner of legal representation and be bound by the same duties to the child as is due an adult client,
in accordance with the rules of professional conduct.”).
106. See Rule 16-102(A) NMRA (“[A] lawyer shall abide by a client’s decisions concerning the
objective of representation.”).
107. See N.M. STAT. ANN. 1978 § 32A-4-2(B) (2016); N.M. STAT. ANN. 1978 § 32A-1-4(B) (2016)
(“‘[C]hild’ means a person who is less than eighteen years old.”).
108. See Lockie, supra note 5, at 131.
109. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 393 (1981).
110. See Lockie, supra note 5, at 131.
111. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 393.
112. See Albuquerque Rape Crisis Ctr. v. Blackmer, 2005-NMSC-032, ¶ 11, 120 P.3d 820.
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16-106. Because attorneys are required under the rule to maintain client confidences,
it would be inconsistent to also mandate lawyers to report known or suspected child
abuse and neglect learned within the attorney-client relationship. Rule 16-106(B)
permissively allows attorneys to make such reports to (1) prevent against reasonably
certain death or substantial bodily harm,113 or (2) comply with another law,114 but the
rule does not require disclosure under those circumstances.115 The universal
reporting statute and Rule 16-106 are facially irreconcilable, though they may
comport with each other in certain situations.
Consider the scenario presented by the court in Strauch, where an officer of
the court must consider whether to disclose protected information.116 Imagine an
attorney learns of past117 child neglect through confidential conversations with her
client. According to Rule 16-106(A), that information must not be disclosed unless
it fits within the exceptions in Rule 16-106(B). The following two sections analyze
those exceptions within the foregoing scenario.
i.

Disclosure is permitted to prevent reasonably certain death or
substantial bodily harm.

Under the first exception, the attorney would have to assess whether
disclosing the information by reporting the past neglect would prevent reasonably
certain death or substantial bodily harm in the future.118 If there is no indication that
the neglect of the past will occur again, reporting the information would not likely
“eliminate the threat or reduce the number of victims.”119 In this case, disclosure
would not be permitted under Rule 16-106(B)(1), so the reporting requirement and
the court rule would come into conflict. Here, the court rule would supersede the
reporting statute,120 and the attorney likely would not be required to disclose
confidential information in order to report past neglect.
If, however, the past neglect indicates a pattern of behavior that may
endanger the lives or physical safety of children in the future, the attorney would
certainly be allowed to report what she knows to the authorities, even if doing so
would require her to share confidential information.121 In this instance, Rule 16106(B)(1) conforms with the purpose of the reporting statute to protect the safety of
children. Both rules likely would be given effect under the Blackmer consistency
test.122

113. Rule 16-106(B)(1) NMRA.
114. Rule 16-106(B)(6) NMRA.
115. See Rule 16-106(B) NMRA.
116. See State v. Strauch, 2015-NMSC-009, ¶ 41, 345 P.3d 317.
117. The reporting statute broadly defines what must be reported - “knowledge or reasonable suspicion
that a child is an abused or neglect child.” N.M. STAT. ANN. 1978 § 32A-4-3(A) (2005). Absent from the
statute are temporal considerations. The statute seems to contemplate required reporting of past abuse and
neglect, as well as ongoing and future abuse and neglect.
118. See Rule 16-106(B)(1) NMRA.
119. See Comment 8 to Rule 16-106 NMRA.
120. See Albuquerque Rape Crisis Ctr. v. Blackmer, 2005-NMSC-032, ¶ 11, 120 P.3d 820.
121. See Rule 16-106(B)(1) NMRA.
122. See Blackmer, 2005-NMSC-032, ¶ 11.
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Disclosure is permitted to comply with another law or court order.

The other relevant exception to Rule 16-106(A) permits disclosure to
comply with another law or court order.123 There is room under this exception for an
attorney to comply with the reporting statute. If an attorney, who believed himself to
be a mandatory reporter under the Act, reported his knowledge or suspicion that a
child was an abused or neglected child, he likely would not face disciplinary action
by the New Mexico Supreme Court because his actions would be allowable under
Rule 16-106(B)(6).124 Under these circumstances, the reporting statute and Rule 16106(B)(6) are not in conflict and both would be binding on the attorney.
Because the exception is permissive, however, reporting cannot be
mandatory for attorneys who learn of abuse or neglect within an attorney-client
context. If the attorney chose not to report his knowledge of abuse because reporting
would disclose confidential client information, he likely would not be held to
disciplinary action.125 Rule 16-106(B)(6) allows the attorney the discretion to choose
whether to comply with a law that may contradict the rules of professional conduct.
As stated above, the requirement of the reporting statute does not comport with the
permissive exceptions to the rule not to disclose confidential client information. In
this situation, Rule 16-106 would likely take precedence over the reporting statute.126
III.

REPORTING REQUIREMENTS HINDER THE ATTORNEYCLIENT RELATIONSHIP

If attorneys are required to report child abuse and neglect within the context
of the attorney-client relationship, their role as advisor and counselor could be
transformed into a role of informant and investigator.127 The mere mention of the
potential need for the attorney to report child abuse and neglect could chill the
attorney-client relationship, and may lead the client to believe that her wishes are not
as important as the state’s pursuit of information about child abuse or neglect.128
The attorney-client privilege, as both a common law privilege and a
codified state evidence rule, helps maintain societal order and fairness. In Upjohn
Co. v. United States, the Supreme Court explained that the attorney-client privilege
exists “to encourage full and frank communication between attorneys and their
clients and thereby promote broader public interests in the observance of law and
administration of justice.”129 New Mexico attorneys rely on this open

123. See Rule 16-106(B)(6) NMRA.
124. See id.
125. It is possible he would be subject to the ethical rule requiring attorneys to follow the law. See
Rule 16-804(B) NMRA.
126. See Blackmer, 2005-NMSC-032, ¶ 11.
127. See Mosteller, supra note 91, at 208.
128. See Lockie, supra note 5, at 140 (explaining that in cases of domestic violence, the attorney may
be viewed as more concerned with the children than with the client suffering the abuse. “Rather than using
the first meeting to build trust and rapport, the attorney uses the early moments to explain often unclear
and complicated reporting requirements. Instead of assuring the client that the attorney is her advocate,
the attorney sends the message that the client’s children are more deserving than she is of protection.”).
129. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981).
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communication, insured by the attorney-client privilege and Rule 16-106, in order to
thoroughly represent, advise, and advocate for their clients.130
A fully intact attorney-client privilege, unhindered by mandatory reporting,
is socially beneficial for three reasons. First, it helps attorneys achieve the best
outcome for their clients armed with the complete facts of their clients’ cases.131 If
attorneys must report the mere suspicion of child abuse, clients would likely guard
themselves in discussing the treatment of their children.132 This could mean that a
divorce lawyer does not know all the facts before a custody hearing,133 or a domestic
violence lawyer does not hear the extent of an abuser’s ill treatment.134 Society values
the attorney-client privilege as a measure to advance our adversarial system.135
Without it, lawyers may not be able to fully represent their clients in the same
capacity we have come to expect.136
Second, the full attorney-client privilege enables attorneys to direct clients
to comply with the law.137 In the abuse and neglect context, this means that an
attorney might be able to counsel his client to avoid instances of child abuse or
neglect.138 It should be noted that in New Mexico, however, if an attorney
encouraged her client to seek treatment for abusive behavior, the conversations
between the client and the psycho-therapist relating to the abuse would not be
privileged.139
Finally, the attorney-client privilege protects clients from state
encroachment on their rights.140 Lawyers help individuals maintain autonomy from
the state, but can only do the best version of their job if they have complete
information.141 We have chosen to afford representation and privilege to even the
potentially criminally guilty in society.142 To require attorneys to report child abuse
and neglect when their clients may not have committed a crime – or are the victims
themselves – conflicts with American society’s most individualistic ideals.143

130. See Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 51 (1980); Comment 4 to Rule 16-106 NMRA.
131. See Mosteller, supra note 91, at 260.
132. See id. at 262 (“[I]t is easy to see how a lawyer’s duty to reveal even a ‘reason to suspect’ child
abuse might inhibit the client’s candor in describing unconventional treatment of his children.”).
133. See id.
134. See Lockie, supra note 5, at 148 (“Mandatory child abuse reporting by attorneys has severe
consequences for victims of domestic violence, including increasing the physical danger to victims and
their children, subjecting domestic violence victims to ongoing state intervention and potential criminal
prosecution for abuse or neglect, and discoursing victims of domestic violence from seeking legal
assistance.”).
135. See Marrus, supra note 4, at 522 (“Without the existence of [the attorney-client privilege], it
would be difficult for our adversarial system to exist as it does today.”).
136. See id. (“It is the privilege that enables attorneys to fully represent their clients within our presentday legal system.”)
137. See Mosteller, supra note 91, at 260.
138. See id. at 262.
139. See State v. Strauch, 2015-NMSC-009, ¶ 41, 345 P.3d 317.
140. See Mosteller, supra note 91, at 266.
141. See id.
142. See id. at 267.
143. See id. (“Indeed the rights-based theory remains the bedrock, and perhaps the only viable
justification for protecting the attorney-client privilege in the area of child abuse.”).
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Ultimately, attorneys should not be required under the Act to report known
or suspected child abuse outside the parameters already established by the crimefraud exception to the attorney-client privilege and the exceptions for disclosure of
client confidences in Rule 16-106(B). Child abuse and neglect are terrible societal
ills, but it would be a greater ill if individuals no longer felt able to fully communicate
with their lawyers, free from state intervention.
CONCLUSION
In State v. Strauch, the New Mexico Supreme Court held that the reporting
requirement of the Abuse and Neglect Act applies to all people in New Mexico. This
blanket requirement likely does not apply to attorneys in situations where their
clients share information about child abuse or neglect typically protected by
attorney-client confidentiality rules. Court rules of practice and procedure, such as
the evidentiary rule of attorney-client privilege and the rules of professional conduct
governing client confidences, supersede state statutes when the court rules and state
laws come into conflict. As the attorney-client privilege and Rule 16-106 prohibit
attorneys from disclosing confidential client information outside of limited
exceptions, these rules may conflict with the universal reporting statute which
requires disclosure in all circumstances. The court rules likely take precedence over
the reporting requirement in most situations, thereby relieving attorneys of their duty
to report child abuse and neglect within an attorney-client relationship.

